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Struggles between broad penal policy and judicial discretion at 
sentencing have a deep history in the common law. From the earliest 
years of the English common law, and for centuries thereafter, there was 
a fixed penalty for almost all felonies: death by hanging.
1
 The resulting 
inflexible harshness in sentencing was, on its face, unacceptable given 
the range of offences and circumstances that could be caught by this 
fixed rule of punishment. As Baker explains, this mandatory sentence 
―excluded undue savagery as well as undue mercy, but it introduced 
excessive uniformity: the multiple murderer expected nothing worse than 
the accidental slayer or the petty villain who stole two shillings‖.
2
 Yet 
this legal rule that seemed intolerable — and that appears today as utterly 
barbaric — survived for centuries because judges found means to evade 
its harshness. One device seized upon by common law judges was 
―benefit of clergy‖. Benefit of clergy arose as a political resolution 
between the papacy and the English monarchy and crystallized in the 
aftermath of the controversy that erupted after the murder of Thomas 
Becket in 1170. The compromise was that the punishment of clerics 
would be a matter for ecclesiastical authorities only and, as such, if an 
accused could demonstrate to a common law court that he was a clergyman, 
                                                                                                             
  Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I am grateful to Gerry 
Ferguson and Kent Roach for comments on earlier versions of this article. Thank you also to Alison 
Latimer for her fine editorial advice and notes on the piece and to Gordon Brandt for his excellent 
research assistance.  
1  J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 
2002), at 512 [hereinafter ―Baker‖]. Baker explains that there were very limited exceptions to this 
rule, including (for obvious reasons) a special rule for suicide, which was punishable by forfeiture 
only. 
2  Baker, id., at 512. 
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he would not be punished under the laws of England, but rather would be 
handed over to the Church.
3
  
Although strictly applied in its early years, benefit of clergy 
transformed into a judicially endorsed legal fiction between 1350 and 
1490. Judges came to use benefit of clergy as an available tool to 
mitigate the harshness of the sentencing regime; benefit of clergy thus 
began its life as a means of avoiding the mandatory death penalty. In the 
early years, those claiming benefit of clergy were closely scrutinized to 
ensure that they were, indeed, clerics; however, by the 14th and 15th 
centuries, whether one could read became the only criterion for determining 
if one was ―clergy‖ and, thus, not subject to ordinary English law. And 
the test for whether an offender was literate had its own extreme 
artificiality. An accused convicted of a felony would ―fall on his knees 
and ‗pray the book‘‖.
4
 He would then be asked to read or recite a passage 
from the psalter — called the ―neck-verse‖ — and if he could do so 
satisfactorily, he had successfully proven his clergy. The neck-verse soon 
became standardized, the accused always being asked to read or recite 
the same passage: verse 1 of Psalm 51.
5
 Soon, that verse was inscribed 
on gaol walls and memorized by prisoners who, if they could recite it at 
the appropriate time, were deemed ―clergy‖ by force of legal fiction and 
exempted from the death penalty.
6
 The use of this device quickly became 
widespread, with nearly half of all convicted felons successfully claiming 
benefit of clergy.
7
 The existence of unrefined and overly harsh 
sentencing rules impelled actors in the criminal justice system to look to 
means at their disposal to patch the resulting injustices in the system — 
and one result was a vast population of fictional clergy. Though this use 
of the benefit of clergy meant that the death penalty could be avoided in 
this period of the common law,
8
 this fiction exacted a toll on the integrity 
                                                                                                             
3  See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2d ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1981), at 420. 
4  Baker, supra, note 1, at 514. 
5  In Hebrew editions and translations from the Hebrew, the passage is Psalms 51:3: ―Have 
mercy on me, O God, as befits Your faithfulness; in keeping with Your abundant compassion, blot 
out my transgressions.‖ Baker reproduces it in the Latin that the convict would, at the time, have had 
to recite: ―Miserere mei Deus secundum magnam misericordiam tuam, et secundum multitudinem 
miserationum tuarum dele iniquitatem meam.‖ 
6  Baker writes that ―with a little preparation anyone of intelligence could save his life‖. 
Baker, supra, note 1, at 514. 
7  Baker, id., at 514, citing Cockburn, Assize Records: Introduction, at 117-21. 
8  Parliament would eventually begin to respond with legislation curtailing this fiction, first 
establishing that one could have the benefit of clergy only once, and later making an increasing 
number of offences ―non-clergiable‖. Benefit of clergy was ultimately abolished in 1827. For this 
later history of benefit of clergy, see Baker, id., at 514-15. Milsom, supra, note 3, at 421, offers a 
short and classic summary: ―The common law would have sent all felons to the gallows; the benefit 
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and health of the system of law. The continued existence of the 
mandatory sentence of death over this period of time ―had a stultifying 
effect on the substantive law. … Legal ingenuity was devoted to 
elaborating the evasions instead of improving the substance of the law‖.
9
 
Despite the vast and apparent differences in both the social context 
and the law of the Middle Ages as compared to modern practices of 
crime and punishment, the contemporary Canadian criminal justice 
system continues to wrestle with the tensions produced by fixed 
mandatory sentences when judges are faced with the exigencies of justice 
based on the particularities of a given case. The death penalty is no 
longer the source of concern in Canada; rather, it is the existence and 
current proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences. The tools are 
very different as well: issues of the justness of such fixed minimums are 
filtered through constitutional law, with the narrow protection against 
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under section 12 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
10
 setting the standard for 
judicial interference with legislated minimums. But just as in former 
times, Canadian judges in the Charter era have reached for available 
tools to repair injustices produced by legislative sentencing schemes that 
include minimum sentences putatively applicable to all offenders who 
commit given offences, irrespective of the gravity and circumstances of 
the crime or of the blameworthiness of the individuals involved. The 
Supreme Court of Canada established one means of addressing a 
manifestly unjust minimum sentence: if, positing reasonable hypotheticals, 
an accused could show that a mandatory minimum sentence would result 
in cruel and unusual punishment, the law was unconstitutional and 
should be declared of no force or effect pursuant to section 52(1) of the 
Constitution.
11
 But the ―reasonable hypothetical analysis‖ was contained 
by limiting the hypotheticals to those situations that ―could commonly 
arise in day-to-day life‖,
12
 ―as opposed to far-fetched or marginally 
imaginable cases‖.
13
 The hypotheticals would have to reflect situations 
that were ―‗common‘ rather than ‗extreme‘ or ‗far-fetched‘‖.
14
 
                                                                                                             
of clergy as it developed would have saved them all; and legislation sought to introduce order by 
deciding when the second anachronism should interfere with the first.‖  
9  Baker, supra, note 1, at 512. 
10  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter ―Charter‖]. 
11  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11; R. 
v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter ―Smith‖]; R. v. Goltz, 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter ―Goltz‖]. 
12  Goltz, id., at 511. 
13  Id., at 506. 
14  R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
―Morrisey‖]. See Kent Roach, ―Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences‖ 
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But life offers up more than we can imagine in our reasonable 
hypotheticals — more than the common and ordinary — so the question 
remained, what is to be done when faced with the extraordinary and 
theretofore unimagined case? Courts and commentators began to interpret 
the broad remedial power conferred by section 24(1) of the Charter as the 
tool available and appropriate in such circumstances. If, in the case 
before him or her, no matter how exceptional or uncommon the 
circumstances, the minimum sentence would inflict cruel and unusual 
punishment on the offender, a judge could confer a ―constitutional 
exemption‖ that would reassert judicial discretion to craft a fair and just 
sentence by excepting this individual from the statutory sentence, while 
leaving the legislation otherwise applicable.
15
 Such a remedy would 
mitigate the unconstitutional harshness of the sentence in a given case, 
but the law would remain ―on the books‖, constitutional in its ordinary 
application.  
In R. v. Ferguson,
16
 a decision issued early in 2008, the Supreme 
Court of Canada put an end to the use of constitutional exemptions in 
such situations. The Court not only declined to issue a constitutional 
exemption in this case but further ruled that the only remedy available in 
such cases is the more radical declaration of invalidity pursuant to 
section 52(1). With this extinction of the constitutional exemption, some 
lamented the loss of ―a workable solution to the problem of the exceptional 
case‖,
17
 concerned that this ―source of comfort is no longer available‖.
18
 
One possible reading of Ferguson is as a retreat from close scrutiny of 
minimum sentences. My argument in this article is that this reading of 
                                                                                                             
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367 [hereinafter ―Roach‖] for an account of the increased restraint with 
which the Court approached the scrutiny of mandatory minimums under s. 12 in the period from 
Smith to R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Roach links this trend to a 
general ―constitutional minimalism‖ that could be discerned in the Court‘s jurisprudence during this 
era.  
15  For a discussion of the history of, and some issues raised by, constitutional exemptions 
see Peter Sankoff, ―Constitutional Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring a Swift Resolution‖ 
(2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 231 [hereinafter ―‗An Ongoing Problem‘‖]; Peter Sankoff, ―Constitutional 
Exemptions: Myth or Reality?‖ (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 411. 
16  [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter ―Ferguson‖]. 
17  Lisa Dufraimont, ―R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences under Section 12‖ (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459, at 470 [hereinafter 
―Dufraimont‖]. See also Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf ed., vol. 2 (2007), 
at 40-21. Hogg approves of the use of constitutional exemptions in minimum sentence cases, saying 
that there is ―much to be said for it‖ in that ―[i]t would enable the courts to keep in force a minimum 
sentence that was not disproportionate in the great majority of its applications, while applying 
normal sentencing principles to the rare set of facts where the defendant‘s lack of moral culpability 
would make the minimum sentence cruel and unusual.‖ 
18  Dufraimont, id., at 474. 
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Ferguson fails to reflect the core message of the case, a message that, if 
internalized by judges, amounts to a constitutional push-back on the 
politics of minimum sentences. It is a decision that clearly and emphatically 
calls upon judges to stop cleaning up the occasional mess that trails 
behind minimum sentences and, instead, to impel Parliament to wrestle 
with the details of justice in sentencing. It is a decision that resists the 
opening of a chasm between the law as it is written and the law as it is 
applied, a chasm that, as the story of benefit of clergy demonstrates, 
ultimately erodes the integrity of the legal system. This is not, in my 
view, a rosy or hopeful reading of the case; rather, it is the strong 
message of Ferguson when read as an intervention in the politics of 
minimum sentences. Ferguson ought to be received by advocates and 
judges as a direction to stop devoting legal ingenuity to elaborating the 
evasions and, instead, to seek to improve the substance of the law.  
II. THE POLITICAL APPEAL AND PRACTICAL PERIL OF  
MINIMUM SENTENCES 
Mandatory minimum sentences are in political fashion. On February 
28, 2008, the day before the judgment in Ferguson was released, Royal 
Assent was given to the Tackling Violent Crime Act,
19
 which not only 
increased certain existing minimum sentences but also added to the 
already long list of minimum sentences in the Criminal Code.
20
 Early in 
2009, the Conservative government introduced two Bills that would 
increase or add minimum sentences for organized crime
21
 and would 
establish mandatory minimum periods of incarceration for certain drug 
offences, particularly targeted at those involving criminal organizations 
and crimes that might affect youth.
22
 By way of example, Bill C-14 
would impose a minimum sentence of four years‘ imprisonment on 
                                                                                                             
19  S.C. 2008, c. 6. 
20  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Dufraimont, supra, note 17, at 464, reports that ―[a]s of 2006, about 
40 Criminal Code offences carried minimum terms of imprisonment, including first and second 
degree murder, numerous firearms and weapons offences, various sexual offences involving children 
and a few impaired driving offences.‖  
21  Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and protection of justice 
system participants), S.C. 2009, c. 22 (Royal Assent, June 23, 2009 [not in force]). It is important to 
note the breadth of the definition of a ―criminal organization‖, found in s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal 
Code. Any group of three or more persons facilitating or committing (or whose purpose includes 
committing) a ―serious offence‖ that would accrue to its benefit is, potentially, a criminal 
organization. 
22  Bill C-15, An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related 
and consequential amendments to other Acts. 
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anyone who intentionally discharged a firearm while being reckless as to 
the life or safety of another and would classify any gang-related murder 
as first degree murder. Bill C-15 would impose a minimum sentence of 
two years‘ imprisonment for trafficking in a host of drugs, including 
heroin, ―in or near any … public place usually frequented by persons 
under the age of 18 years‖. Importing any amount of marijuana for the 
purposes of trafficking would be punishable by a minimum sentence of 
one year. A minimum sentence of two or, in some circumstances, three 
years would be imposed on anyone producing any amount of a Schedule 
I substance. These amendments were largely a political response to a 
spate of gang-based crimes in British Columbia‘s Lower Mainland. 
Justice Minister Rob Nicholson explained that, in introducing this 
legislation, ―[o]ur message to potential offenders is clear: if you sell or 
produce drugs, you will face jail time.‖
23
 The government‘s press release 
explained that ―[t]his Government is taking the necessary steps to crack 




Yet the weight of social science evidence indicates that minimum 
sentences are not effective as a crime-control strategy
25
 and numerous 
commissions that have considered the issue have suggested abolition of 
fixed minimums.
26
 Minimum sentences do not make communities safer. 
                                                                                                             
23  ―Tories bring in mandatory sentences for serious dug crimes‖ CBC News (February 27, 
2009) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/02/27/bc-guns-
gangs-legislation.html?ref=rss>.  
24  ―Government re-introduces legislation to fight serious drug crimes‖ Department of Justice 
(February 27, 2009) online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2009/doc_32338.html>.  
25  See Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, ―The Political Attractiveness of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences‖ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287, at 293-97, offering the following sharp 
summary of the social science evidence: ―mandatory minimum sentences do not deter more than less 
harsh, proportionate sentences‖ (at 291). See also Roach, supra, note 14, at 389: ―There is little 
evidence to support the hope that mandatory penalties of imprisonment, which may not even be 
known to the general public, will serve as effective deterrents of crimes committed against 
vulnerable people.‖ 
26  See the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach 
(Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987) (Chair: J.R. Archambault) [hereinafter 
―1987 Canadian Sentencing Commission‖]. The Canadian Sentencing Commission observed that, 
reaching back to the 1952 Royal Commission on the Revision of the Criminal Code, ―all Canadian 
commissions that have addressed the role of mandatory minimum penalties have recommended that 
they be abolished‖ (at 178). The Commission itself concluded that, with the exception of the 
penalties prescribed for murder and high treason, mandatory minimum sentences ―serve no purpose 
that can compensate for the disadvantages resulting from their continued existence‖ (at 188) and, 
emphasizing the principle of proportionality and the importance of determining a just sentence in the 
particular case before a court, stated that mandatory minimum sentences ―have no place in a 
sentencing framework designed to provide guidance in the determination of individual sentences‖  
(at 189).  
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The extreme form of mandatory minimum sentencing reflected in the 
U.S. experiment with strict sentencing ―guidelines‖ has been a terrible 
failure,
27
 contributing to massive increases in rates of incarceration.
28
 
The U.S. experience is also one of minimum sentences deepening racial 
and gender inequities in the administration of criminal justice.
29
 
Canadian commentators emphasize this potential for mandatory 
minimum sentences to visit disproportionately harsh effects on already 
marginalized or vulnerable groups within the criminal justice system.
30
 
All of this information is widely available and there should be little doubt 
                                                                                                             
27  See Frank O. Bowman, III, ―The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Structural Analysis‖ (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1315 [hereinafter ―Bowman‖]. Bowman describes 
U.S. policies surrounding sentencing and corrections in the last quarter of the 20th century as 
involving two trends. First, ―the country undertook a national experiment in mass incarceration as a 
response to crime‖ (at 1317). Second, whereas penal policy in the first 75 years of the 20th century 
gave importance to rehabilitative objectives and conferred considerable discretion on sentencing 
judges, in the last 25 years ―many jurisdictions moved to regimes of structured sentencing featuring 
varying combinations of statutory minimum sentences, sentencing guidelines, and other mechanisms 
designed to channel or constrain judicial sentencing discretion‖ (at 1318). See also Gary T. 
Lowenthal, ―Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate 
Sentencing Reform‖ (1993) 81 Cal. L. Rev. 61, at 61-62 [hereinafter ―Lowenthal‖], citing ―[t]wo 
developments … that have transformed felony sentencing in the United States‖ — the creation of 
determinate sentencing schemes and the creation of minimum sentencing laws. Although an early 
supporter of the federal sentencing guidelines, even Bowman has since ―with the greatest reluctance, 
concluded that the federal sentencing guidelines system has failed‖ (at 1319). In terms that ought to 
be of substantial concern to those forming penal policy in Canada, Bowman explains: ―I have 
reached this conclusion not merely because the system too often produces bad outcomes in 
individual cases and sometimes in whole classes of cases, but more importantly because the basic 
structure of the guidelines-centered system has evolved in a way that makes self-correction virtually 
impossible‖ (at 1319).  
28  Bowman, id., at 1328, remarks that ―by any standard the severity and frequency of 
punishment imposed by the federal criminal process during the guidelines era is markedly greater 
than it had been before‖, citing a 600 per cent increase in federal inmate populations since the 1980s. 
29  For an analysis that focuses on increased disparities, including racial disparities, that have 
arisen under the guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, ―Disparity: The Normative and Empirical 
Failure of the Federal Guidelines‖ (2005) 58 Stan. L. Rev. 85 [hereinafter ―Alschuler‖]. Alschuler 
summarizes his findings as follows (at 85):  
When viewed from any coherent normative perspective, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines have failed to reduce disparity and probably have increased it. Even on paper, 
these Guidelines often fail to treat like offenders alike, and the Guidelines are worse in 
practice than on paper. The luck of the judicial draw appears to determine the sentences 
offenders serve as much as or more than it did before the Guidelines; the region of the 
country in which an offender is sentenced now makes a greater difference than it did 
before the Guidelines; and racial and gender disparities have increased. 
See also David B. Mustard, ―Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from 
U.S. Federal Courts‖ (2001) 44 J.L. & Econ. 285 [hereinafter ―Mustard‖]. 
30  For a discussion of the disproportionate impact of mandatory minimum sentences on 
Aboriginal peoples, see Larry N. Chartrand, ―Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing‖ (2001) 
39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449 [hereinafter ―Chartrand‖]; for the potential insidious effects of mandatory 
minimums on battered women, see Elizabeth Sheehy, ―Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences‖ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529 [hereinafter ―Sheehy‖]. 
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that the politicians responsible for Canada‘s headlong dive into the 
proliferation of minimum sentences are aware of it. Yet the tune of 
minimum sentencing seems to be a political siren song. Faced with 
public fear arising from serious and highly publicized incidents of violent 
crime, politicians can find a strong and clear answer in the introduction 
of new mandatory minimums. The response of introducing new and 
―tough‖ minimum sentences is easily explained to and by the media and 
readily digested by the public. The political message is neat: the 
government views these crimes as very serious, utterly unacceptable and 
anyone who puts the community at risk in this way should be removed 
from society. The mandatory minimum sentence is perfectly packaged 
for a public whose attention is focused by current high-profile crimes, 
even if crime rates (including violent crimes) are in fact on the decline.
31
 
A government can move swiftly, acting decisively while underscoring a 
―tough on crime‖ position. In all of this there are votes to be won. 
Furthermore, a government can take comfort in the knowledge of its 
relative political security in making such legislative interventions. When 
the public mood is one of fear and apprehension of risk, opposition 
politicians will find little appeal in challenging a government on the 
wisdom of such clean-cut and decisive penal policies. To attempt to push 
a government on the effectiveness and necessity of minimum sentences 
carries the very real political risk of being tarred as unsympathetic to 
victims and, more generally, ―soft on crime‖, irrespective of what the 
evidence suggests about the efficacy of such measures and the systemic 
toll that minimum sentences take on the administration of criminal 
justice in the longue durée. The conventional wisdom is that there are 
simply no votes to be gained in a counsel of parsimony and patience as 
regards criminal justice; to believe and to behave otherwise as a 
politician requires a measure of political courage unshackled to populism 
that, based on recent history, we have little basis to expect. In the end, 
the mandatory minimum sentence is an ideal tool on which a government 
                                                                                                             
31  In ―Crime Statistics in Canada, 2007‖, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics reported 
that the national crime rate reached its lowest point since 1977, while a drop in violent crime 
―continued the downward trend in violent crime evident since the early 1990s and marked the lowest 
rate in nearly 20 years‖ (at 4). Rates of homicide, attempted murder, sexual assault, assault, and 
robbery all dropped. Statistics Canada reported that ―[a]mong the few crimes to increase in 2007 
were drug offences and impaired driving, both of which tend to be influenced by police enforcement 
practices. Drug offences were up 4%, with cannabis possession accounting for most of the increase.‖ 
See Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, ―Crime Statistics in Canada, 2007‖ (Statistics Canada – 
Catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 28, no. 7), online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/ 
85-002-x/85-002-x2008007-eng.pdf>.  
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) A MORE LASTING COMFORT? 109 
steeped in ―tough on crime‖ rhetoric can rely in times of public fear 
about crime; and so the politics of minimum sentences augur strongly in 
the direction of the continued proliferation of fixed minimum sentences.  
Once drawn down from the order papers and fixed as a part of the 
criminal justice system, these minimums carry with them a number of 
perils that seriously disrupt the proper day-to-day administration of 
justice in Canada. Although perhaps not matters with which most 
politicians are concerned — or at least not until the financial costs of 
these minimums visit them — these are the issues presented by minimum 
sentences with which judges, Crown and defence must wrestle. 
Certain of these perils are institutional in nature. One clear practical 
difficulty with minimum sentences is that, to the extent that they 
incarcerate those who might otherwise have received a non-custodial 
sentence, these fixed minimums increase the prison population, further 
overcrowding a corrections system already bursting at the seams.
32
 We 
are seeing prisoners bunked two and three to a cell and the creation of 
any minimum sentence without a parallel increase in the funding of 
corrections facilities simply exacerbates this problem. For those 
unmoved by prison conditions alone, viewed from the perspective of the 
intersection of penal policy and public safety, the increased crowding of 
the prison system without a corresponding increase in funding to 
correctional services means that education and rehabilitation programs 
                                                                                                             
32  After canvassing the practice of ―triple-bunking‖ and the overcrowding in Toronto‘s Don 
Jail, in R. v. Smith, [2003] O.J. No. 1782, at para. 8 (Ont. C.J.), Schneider J. referred to the standards 
set by the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders and 
concluded that ―the Toronto jail as presently operated is substandard and … an embarrassment to the 
Canadian Criminal Justice System‖. Judge Schneider drew similar conclusions, and canvassed in 
greater detail the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of offenders and to which Canada is a 
signatory, in R. v. Permesar, [2003] O.J. No. 5420 (Ont. C.J.). In R. v. Kravchov, [2002] O.J. No. 
2172, 4. C.R. (6th) 137 (Ont. C.J.), Kenkel J. awarded more than 3:1 enhanced credit for pre-trial 
custody to an offender who had been subjected to deplorable conditions, many a product of 
overcrowding and the consequent practice of triple-bunking. Justice Watt addressed the practice of 
―triple-bunking‖ or ―triple-celling‖ in R. v. Jabhour, [2001] O.J. No. 3820 (Ont. S.C.J.), concluding 
(at para. 43) that ―[t]hree adults in a six by nine cell is a bit much, no matter who sleeps where. The 
overcrowding raises significant health concerns and is simply unacceptable.‖ See also R. v. Prince, 
[2006] O.J. No. 3776, at para. 87 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Robinson, [2001] O.J. No. 5325, at para. 35 (Ont. 
C.J.). Many of these judicial discussions arose in the context of judges assessing whether to award 
―enhanced credit‖ for pre-trial custody, one means by which judges can reflect the deplorable 
conditions in the underfunded correctional system and exert some pressure for reform. On March 27, 
2009, the Conservative government gave first reading to Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Criminal 
Code (limiting credit for time spent in pre-sentencing custody), also titled The Truth in Sentencing 
Act. The Bill would abolish the practice of awarding 2-for-1 credit for pre-trial detention, instituting 
a new general standard of giving only 1:1 credit and creating a new maximum of 1:1.5 credit only ―if 
the circumstances justify it‖.   
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are less available to inmates, most of whom, irrespective of the length of 
their sentence, will ultimately re-enter society.
33
  
Another peril of minimum sentences lies in the pre-trial incentives 
that they trigger. Although the exercise of charging discretion is common 
and necessary in our system, mandatory minimums can ―invite evasion 
by justice system officials‖,
34
 potentially inducing police and prosecutors 
alike to refuse to proceed with a charge or to charge with alternative 
offences in an effort to avoid the infliction of what might be a 
disproportionate minimum penalty in the circumstances. The substantive 
law is thus distorted through the loss of nuance and contextual 
responsiveness in sentencing. Perhaps most significantly, plea negotiations 
can also be dangerously distorted by minimum sentences. Chillingly, 
given our systemic reliance on guilty pleas,
35
 we have increasingly 
understood that the pressures surrounding plea bargaining can present 
real risks of miscarriages of justice.
36
 The multiplication of high minimum 
                                                                                                             
33  With prison overcrowding, ―there is less of everything to go around, so the same space 
and resources are made to stretch even further. The opportunities for inmates to participate in self-
improvement and rehabilitative programs, such as academic, employment and vocational training are 
curtailed‖. John Howard Society of Alberta, ―Prison Overcrowding‖ (1996), at 2, online: The John 
Howard Society of Alberta <http://www.johnhoward.ab.ca/PUB/PDF/C42.pdf>. 
34  Dufraimont, supra, note 17, at 465. 
35  Statistics Canada reports that 89 per cent of guilty dispositions in 2006-2007 were based 
on a guilty plea. See Statistics Canada, ―Adult Criminal Court Statistics‖ (May 20, 2008), online: 
Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080520/dq080520e-eng.htm>. Based on 
the figures provided by Statistics Canada, this means that of all of the cases that enter the system, 
including the 30 per cent of cases that result in a stay of proceedings or charges withdrawn, almost 
60 per cent of all cases are disposed of by way of guilty plea. If one looks only at the cases that make 
it to either an acquittal or a finding of guilt, 84 per cent of cases are dealt with by guilty plea. See 
Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, ―Adult Criminal Court Statistics, 2006/2007‖ (Statistics 
Canada – Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 28, No. 5), online: Statistics Canada <http://www. 
statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/85-002-x2008005-eng.pdf>.  
36  See R. v. Hanemaayer, [2008] O.J. No. 3087, 234 C.C.C. (3d) 3 (Ont. C.A.), in which the 
Court entered acquittals for the accused, who had pleaded guilty to, and served a sentence for, 
crimes he did not commit. The case was built on deeply flawed eyewitness identification evidence. 
In setting aside his guilty pleas and declaring the case a miscarriage of justice, Rosenberg J. 
commented (at para. 18) that, although his guilty pleas were voluntary, unequivocal and informed: 
the court cannot ignore the terrible dilemma facing the appellant. He had spent eight 
months in jail awaiting trial and was facing the prospect of a further six years in the 
penitentiary if he was convicted. The estimate of six years was not unrealistic given the 
seriousness of the offence. The justice system held out to the appellant a powerful 
inducement that by pleading guilty he would not receive a penitentiary sentence. 
See also the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario (―The Goudge Commission‖), vol. 
3 (Toronto: Queen‘s Printer for Ontario, 2008), at 451-52. Justice Goudge references the fact that a 
number of the cases engaged by this inquiry, which was triggered by the misconduct of forensic 
pathologist Dr. Charles Smith, involved guilty pleas and that ―in a number of these cases, the 
defendants assert their innocence and explain that they felt compelled to plead guilty to avoid the 
severe consequences that would follow a conviction on the original charges‖. Although his mandate 
precluded drawing conclusions about these cases, Goudge J. nevertheless noted that ―the concern 
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sentences simply magnifies this risk. Met with a choice between the risk 
of conviction for an offence with a high minimum sentence and pleading 
guilty to a lesser offence in which judicial sentencing discretion remains 
undisturbed by Parliament, the incentives for an innocent accused to 
plead guilty become particularly powerful and clear.
37
  
These institutional and procedural perils all interact with another 
substantial issue raised by minimum sentences: their potential for disparate 
impact on those already overrepresented and vulnerable within the criminal 
justice system. As noted above, the U.S. experience is of precisely this 
disproportionate effect, wherein inflexible sentencing regimes have 
exacerbated inequities in the criminal justice system.
38
 In Canada, 
scholars have pointed to minimum sentences as having particularly 
troublesome consequences for Aboriginal peoples, with serious concerns 
also raised about disparate racial impacts and the manner in which 




                                                                                                             
remains that individuals may plead guilty to crimes they did not commit when, for example, a 
murder charge with mandatory life imprisonment and lengthy parole ineligibility is reduced to a 
charge of criminal negligence together with a joint submission of 90 days‘ imprisonment‖. In early 
2009, Richard Brant asked the Ontario Court of Appeal to reopen and reassess his conviction for 
aggravated assault in relation to the death of his son. Faced with Dr. Smith‘s evidence that the child 
had been shaken to death — evidence that has since been seriously discredited — he had pleaded 
guilty instead of facing a manslaughter charge. See Kirk Makin, ―The Justice System‘s ‗Dirty Little 
Secret‘‖, The Globe and Mail (Wednesday, January 14, 2009), at A5. It is a common theme in the 
literature on plea bargaining that ―the risk of convicting the innocent increases when the coercive 
elements surrounding plea bargaining are left unchecked‖: Joseph Di Luca, ―Expedient McJustice or 
Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada‖ (2005) 50 
Crim. L.Q. 14, at 38.  
37  See Dianne L. Martin, ―Distorting the Prosecution Process: Informers, Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences, and Wrongful Convictions‖ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513. Discussing the 
various ways in which minimum sentences can contribute to wrongful convictions, Martin observes 
that ―the risk of certain imprisonment, whether because a mandatory minimum sentence is involved 
or because of the nature of the offence, is almost as helpful in inducing guilty pleas as the denial of 
bail‖ (at 517). In Kate Stith, ―The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion‖ (2008) 117 Yale L.J. 1420, at 1454, the author observes that ―throughout the period of 
‗mandatory‘ guidelines, guilty pleas steadily displaced trials in the federal system‖ to the point that 
―[t]he default is the plea bargain (or sentence bargain), with the adversarial jury trial serving as a 
kind of judicial review for defendants who are not content with administrative adjudication by the 
prosecutor.‖ Discussing, as does Stith, the manner in which minimum sentences shift discretion from 
the judge to the prosecutor, Lowenthal, supra, note 27, at 78, also observes that ―[t]he mandatory 
sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict pressure defendants, who otherwise might test state‘s 
evidence, into accepting guilty pleas.‖  
38  See Alschuler, supra, note 29; Mustard, supra, note 29. 
39  See Chartrand, supra, note 30; Faizal R. Mirza, ―Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing 
and Systemic Racism‖ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 491; Sheehy, supra, note 30. 
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Yet the peril of minimum sentences that triggers constitutional 
concerns related to section 12, and with which Ferguson
40
 engages, 
flows from the essential — and fundamentally problematic — feature of 
minimum sentences: they represent an a priori political judgment about 
what is a just punishment in all circumstances. Such judgments are 
intrinsically dangerous. Parliament has declared that the fundamental 
principle of sentencing is that ―[a] sentence must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.‖
41
 
The essence of a minimum sentence is that it purports to know in 
advance the floor of proportionality for a given offence, irrespective of 
the specifics of the case. But life serves up circumstances far more 
complex and difficult than even the most prescient parliamentary 
committee can anticipate. Cases can find their way before courts — 
indeed, I share Arbour J.‘s conviction expressed in Morrisey
42
 that cases 
will find their way before sentencing judges — in which exceptional 
circumstances make a minimum sentence so unfit as to unjustifiably 
offend the section 12 protection against cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment. Although this is particularly true of crimes that cover broad 
ranges of behaviour, such as criminal negligence (at issue in Morrissey) 
or manslaughter (at issue in Ferguson), given the combined effects of 
time and the extraordinary vicissitudes of life, cases will arise that put 
pressure on any substantial minimum sentence tested against our 
constitutional commitments and fidelity to the morality of proportionality 
in sentencing.
43
 The question is what is to be done in such cases. 
Ferguson answers this question and, I argue, does so in a manner that has 
                                                                                                             
40  Supra, note 16. 
41  Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.  
42  Supra, note 14, at para. 66. Justice Arbour wrote of ―the inevitability that a four-year 
penalty will be grossly excessive for at least some plausible future manslaughter convictions‖. 
43  Morris J. Fish, ―An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment‖ 
(2008) 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57. Justice Fish defends proportionality as the fundamental principle 
of sentencing and, addressing the increased use of mandatory minimum sentences in Canada, warns 
that it is ―plain that derogation from this fundamental principle will necessarily lead in some cases to 
the imposition of disproportionately harsh sentences‖ (at 69). Allan Manson describes mandatory 
minimum penalties as ―an aberrant and unrealistic ‗one size fits all‘ approach which is antithetical to 
the individualized Canadian approach‖ and similarly concludes that ―[b]y submerging individual 
characteristics and the infinite circumstances in which offences can be committed into a uniform 
mould, the mandated sentence will produce some unfair and inordinately harsh responses‖: Allan 
Manson, ―Motivation, the Supreme Court and Mandatory Sentencing for Murder‖ (2001) 39 C.R. 
(5th) 65, at 71. See also the 1987 Canadian Sentencing Commission, supra, note 26, at 186: ―[E]ach 
criminal offence is uniquely defined by its own set of circumstances and the notion of a judge pre-
determining a sentence before hearing the facts seems abhorrent to our notions of justice. If the 
punishment is to fit the crime, then there can be no pre-determined sentences since criminal events 
are not themselves pre-determined.‖ 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) A MORE LASTING COMFORT? 113 
greater potential to disturb the politics of minimum sentences than was 
offered by the constitutional exemption.  
III. INTERPRETING FERGUSON 
The Ferguson case arose out of the fatal shooting of a police 
detainee by an RCMP constable. Constable Ferguson, the accused, 
testified that while placing the detainee in cells, the detainee attacked 
him, pulling his vest over his head and grabbing Constable Ferguson‘s 
firearm. In the ensuing struggle one shot was discharged into the 
detainee‘s stomach, wounding him non-fatally. The booking officer 
testified that he heard the second, and fatal, headshot up to three seconds 
later.  
Section 236(a) of the Criminal Code imposes a minimum sentence of 
four years for manslaughter with a firearm. There is, of course, 
considerable potential overlap between this offence and the offence 
considered and upheld on the basis of the ―reasonable hypotheticals‖ 
analysis in Morrisey
44
 — criminal negligence causing death with a 
firearm, a crime also punishable by a four-year mandatory minimum 
sentence.
45
 Based on this precedent, Constable Ferguson did not 
challenge the general constitutionality of section 236(a) on the basis of a 
reasonable hypotheticals analysis in the courts below
46
 but, rather, argued 
that on the peculiar facts of his case, the minimum sentence would 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment, contrary to section 12 of the 
Charter, and that the appropriate remedy should be a constitutional 
exemption granted pursuant to the wide remedial power conferred on 
courts by section 24(1) of the Charter. Despite what might be regarded as 
the relatively unsympathetic facts in this case, counsel for Constable 
Ferguson no doubt took some cue from Arbour J.‘s reference in Morrisey 
to one situation in which she imagined that section 220(a) of the 
Criminal Code might offend section 12 of the Charter: ―police officers or 
security guards who are required to carry firearms as a condition of their 
employment and who, in the course of their duty, negligently kill 
someone with their firearm.‖
47
 In arguing for a constitutional exemption, 
                                                                                                             
44  Supra, note 14. 
45  Section 220(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.  
46  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 11.  
47  Morrisey, supra, note 14, at para. 86. Justice Arbour was careful to qualify her 
comments: ―Of course, the law will hold such persons to a high standard of care in the use and 
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Ferguson was leaning on Arbour J.‘s suggestion, and certain opinions of 
lower courts,
48
 that when such exceptional circumstances arise the 
appropriate approach would be to exempt the individual from the 
application of the minimum sentence but to leave the law intact given its 
generally constitutional operation. The Court in Ferguson was, thus, 
faced with two questions: first, whether the mandatory minimum for 
manslaughter was cruel and unusual punishment in the circumstances of 
Constable Ferguson‘s case and, second, what the appropriate remedy is 
when a mandatory minimum is found to breach section 12.  
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a unanimous Court, found on 
the facts that the four-year minimum did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. In so doing, the Court reiterated and clarified the role of the 
sentencing judge in finding facts for the purposes of sentencing 
following a jury trial. Ferguson is now the leading case on this point, 
giving a compendious statement of the rules articulated in R. v. Brown,
49
 
in R. v. Gardiner
50
 and in statute.
51
 Having found that there is ―no basis 
for concluding that the four year minimum sentence prescribed by 
Parliament amounts to cruel and unusual punishment on the facts of this 
case‖,
52
 the Court could have chosen to leave the appropriate remedy for 
mandatory minimums that breach section 12 to another day but decided 
instead that ―[t]he matter having been fully argued, it is appropriate to 




The essence of the decision is, thus, the remedial question of what a 
court is to do when a mandatory minimum sentence breaches section 12. 
Ferguson decides the fate of the constitutional exemption applied to 
minimum sentences. The Court is clear and unequivocal in its conclusion 
that the appropriate remedy in such exceptional cases is not a 
                                                                                                             
handling of their firearms; however, it is nonetheless conceivable that circumstances could arise in 
which a four-year penitentiary term could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.‖ 
48  In Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 43, McLachlin C.J.C. listed lower court decisions 
that had considered the use of constitutional exemptions. Whereas the Ontario and New Brunswick 
Courts of Appeal had ruled against the use of constitutional exemptions to exempt individual 
offenders from mandatory sentences, the Courts of Appeal of Saskatchewan and the Northwest 
Territories had granted such exemptions and the B.C. Court of Appeal had approved of them in 
obiter. The Quebec Court of Appeal had offered signals in both directions.  
49  [1991] S.C.J. No. 57, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518 (S.C.C.). 
50  [1982] S.C.J. No. 71, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368 (S.C.C.). 
51  See especially Criminal Code, s. 724.  
52  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 29. 
53  Id., at para. 33. This statement no doubt brings the ruling into the Court‘s category of 
―binding obiter‖ enunciated in R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, at paras. 53ff 
(S.C.C.). 
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constitutional exemption pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter but, 
rather, to declare the law of no force and effect pursuant to section 52(1) 
of the Constitution. Chief Justice McLachlin offered four reasons for this 
conclusion. Her first argument was jurisprudential. She surveyed the 
prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and concluded that, 
although the Court had recognized constitutional exemptions as an 
ancillary remedy appropriate to provide relief to a claimant during the 
currency of a suspension of a declaration of invalidity,
54
 as to stand-alone 
constitutional exemptions, ―the weight of authority thus far is against 
them and sounds a cautionary note.‖
55
 Second, she reasoned that the use 
of constitutional exemptions would be inconsistent with respect for 
Parliament‘s intent in enacting minimum sentences, which the Court 
concluded ―is to remove judicial discretion to impose a sentence below 
the stipulated minimum‖.
56
 To judicially create a sentencing discretion 
by use of a constitutional exemption would be directly contrary to this 
intent and, accordingly, a declaration of invalidity is the least intrusive 
remedy still consistent with Parliament‘s intent.
57
 Chief Justice McLachlin 
concluded that these two reasons alone were ―sufficient to exclude 
constitutional exemptions as an appropriate remedy for unconstitutional 
mandatory minimum sentences‖.
58
 Yet she went on to provide two more 
bases for this conclusion: the remedial structure of the Charter and the 
rule of law. Chief Justice McLachlin explained that section 24(1) was 
properly confined to remedying unconstitutional acts by government 
                                                                                                             
54  Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice McLachlin explains in Ferguson, id., at para. 46, that ―a 
court may grant such an exemption in order to relieve the claimant of the continued burden of the 
unconstitutional law during the period that the striking out remedy is suspended‖.  
55  Ferguson, id., at para. 48. 
56  Id. 
57  This is, effectively, the test established in Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, 
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.); 
and R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.). The Court‘s conclusion that 
Parliament‘s specific and strong purpose was to exclude judicial discretion effectively precluded a s. 
52(1) remedy of reading down the legislation. Chief Justice McLachlin explains in Ferguson, id., at 
para. 50, that ―the effect of granting a constitutional exemption would be to so change the legislation 
as to create something different in nature from what Parliament intended. It follows that a 
constitutional exemption should not be granted.‖ See Kent Roach, ―Editorial: The Future of 
Mandatory Sentences after the Death of Constitutional Exemptions‖ (2008) 54 C.L.Q. 1 [hereinafter 
―‗The Future of Mandatory Sentences‘‖], in which Roach argues that a more tailored s. 52(1) 
remedy would have been both preferable and appropriate and that ―[t]he justification for such 
judicial actions is that the constitution [sic] requires that the legislation be altered.‖ Roach also 
argues, at 2, that the Court‘s view that ―allowing courts to fashion exemptions would undermine 
certainty, fair notice and the rule of law also seems a bit exaggerated‖.  
58  Ferguson, id., at para. 57. 
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pursuant to otherwise constitutional laws whereas unconstitutional laws 
must be dealt with by recourse to section 52(1).
59
 To use section 24(1) to 
address a legislated mandatory minimum with unconstitutional effects 
would undermine principles central to the rule of law, largely by 
impairing the certainty and predictability of the law by creating a 




The legal effect of the decision is, thus, clear and can be briefly 
stated: constitutional exemptions are no longer available in Canada as a 
means of attending to the exceptional case that arises in which a 
minimum sentence would impose cruel and unusual punishment. Instead, 
the offending law should be declared of no force and effect for all 
purposes; the law should be ―struck down‖.  
But if that is the narrow legal effect of Ferguson, how should we 
interpret this decision? In particular, ought we to receive the case as, 
effectively, a retreat from scrutiny of mandatory minimum sentences? 
Should the case be understood as representing the loss of a principled 
means of addressing the perils of minimum sentences? Perhaps most 
meaningfully put, what message should lower court judges and advocates 
take from R. v. Ferguson about the appropriate posture to assume towards 
mandatory minimum sentences? And, indeed, what is the political message 
of Ferguson? 
To interpret the decision, one must first be clear about two things 
that Ferguson does not stand for. First, Ferguson does not affect the 







 None of these cases were overruled by the Court. Indeed, 
McLachlin C.J.C. makes clear that ―[o]rdinarily, a s. 12 analysis for a 
mandatory minimum sentence requires both an analysis of the facts of 
the accused‘s case and an analysis of reasonable hypothetical cases.‖
64
 
The reason the Court did not undertake a careful reasonable hypotheticals 
analysis in Ferguson is that Constable Ferguson did not make this 
argument in the courts below, raising the matter for the first time at the 
Supreme Court. Chief Justice McLachlin concluded simply that 
―Constable Ferguson has not pointed to a hypothetical case where the 
                                                                                                             
59  Id., at paras. 58-66. 
60  Id., at para. 70. See also paras. 67-73. 
61  Supra, note 11. 
62  Supra, note 11. 
63  Supra, note 14. 
64  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 30. 
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offender‘s minimum level of moral culpability for unlawful act 
manslaughter using a firearm would be less than in the reasonable 
hypotheticals considered in Morrisey.‖
65
 Accordingly, after Ferguson, an 
accused can still challenge a mandatory minimum sentence on the basis 
that, positing reasonable hypothetical situations that do not arise in his or 
her case, the sentence could produce cruel and unusual punishment.
66
 If a 
court agrees, the minimum sentence is unconstitutional and of no force or 
effect pursuant to section 52(1). But as I have discussed, the band of 
situations covered by ―reasonable hypotheticals‖ is limited to the 
―common‖ case. Ferguson confirms that an accused can also challenge a 
minimum sentence on the basis that on the facts of his or her own case 
— no matter how uncommon or exceptional the situation — the 
minimum sentence would inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
67
 The 
question in Ferguson is simply what to do if a court agrees. As such, 
Ferguson leaves two routes open to challenging minimum sentences on 
the basis of section 12: an argument based on reasonable hypotheticals 
and an argument based on the peculiar facts of one‘s case. 
Second, the Court did not adjust or affect the test for what constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter. Chief 
Justice McLachlin confirms the rule, enunciated in Smith,
68
 that ―[t]he 
test for whether a particular sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment is whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate.‖
69
 To be 
grossly disproportionate ―the sentence must be more than merely 
                                                                                                             
65  Id., at para. 30. 
66  To posit one such reasonable hypothetical arising from recent legislative changes, a 
hypothetical similar to one suggested by Dufraimont, supra, note 17, at 469, imagine a young 
weapons enthusiast with no criminal record who orders a non-functional replica rifle from the United 
States, knowing that he is not permitted to do so. Pursuant to s. 103(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-46, which was amended in 2008 as part of the Tackling Violent Crime Act, supra, note 19, 
this individual would receive a minimum sentence of three years‘ imprisonment. For further posited 
reasonable hypotheticals, see Paul Calarco, ―R. v. Ferguson: An Opportunity for the Defence‖ 
(2008) 54 C.R. (6th) 223, at 226-27. 
67  For example, even if a mandatory minimum sentence of four years for unlawful act 
manslaughter using a firearm is not unconstitutional on the basis of reasonable (meaning ―common‖) 
hypotheticals, if the unlawful act involved a young man pointing a gun at a friend in jest and pulling 
the trigger, mistakenly thinking that it was unloaded, and if the individual before the court was dying 
of leukemia and had less than two years to live, a court might nevertheless conclude that a 
mandatory four-year term of imprisonment would be cruel and unusual on the exceptional facts of 
the case. Once one turns one‘s attention from a reasonable hypotheticals analysis to consider the 
exceptional case, the peculiar circumstances of the offender become particularly salient and there is 
no natural limit on the constellation of such circumstances that might appear. Imagine, for example, 
that this accused was also of diminished mental capacity or the sole caregiver of an ailing parent.  
68  Supra, note 11. 
69  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 14. 
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excessive‖; ―the sentence must be ‗so excessive as to outrage standards 
of decency‘ and disproportionate to the extent that Canadians ‗would 
find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable‘‖.
70
 It thus remains true that 
it is no easy task to satisfy a court that, on the facts of your case, a 
minimum sentence would inflict cruel and unusual punishment. Although 
some such claims have been successful, it remains the case that this very 
high threshold is open to criticism and ripe for reconsideration.
71
 (Are we 
really satisfied with a law that would create consistently excessive 
sentences so long as this unfitness does not outrage our standards of 
decency?) However, this legal hurdle is the same whether the ultimate 
remedy would be a constitutional exemption or a declaration of invalidity 
pursuant to section 52(1).  
What, then, is the significance of the Court‘s decision in Ferguson? 
My argument is that, in directing judges not to hesitate to strike down 
legislation that, on the facts of an exceptional case before them, would 
inflict cruel and unusual punishment, this judgment exerts constitutional 
pressure on the politics of minimum sentences in a way that the 
constitutional exemption simply could not. Inasmuch as this is so, the 
decision should be received favourably by those wary of the perils of 
minimum sentences.   
In this respect, the most illuminating component of the judgment is 
the Chief Justice‘s remarks after she concludes that the combined 
considerations of the Court‘s past jurisprudence and respect for 
Parliament‘s intent are ―sufficient to exclude constitutional exemptions 
as an appropriate remedy for unconstitutional mandatory minimum 
sentences‖.
72
 The discussion of the remedial scheme of the Charter and 
the rule of law that follows — analysis not strictly necessary to her 
conclusion — exposes a concern for the substantive integrity of the penal 
law. The Chief Justice explains that the mandatory wording of section 
52(1) is an indication that unconstitutional laws — ―over-inclusive laws 
that pose a real risk of unconstitutional treatment of Canadians‖
73
 — 
                                                                                                             
70  Id., citing R. v. Wiles, [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895, at para. 4 (S.C.C.). 
71  For an argument that the protection afforded by s. 12 should be expanded by relaxing this 
standard, see Jamie Cameron, ―Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter‖, in 
Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five Years 
Later (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) 553. Cameron argues, at 588, that ―[t]he Court has 
given section 12 an interpretation which has crippled the entitlement‖ by ―displac[ing] a concept of 
proportionality which would examine the relationship between the blameworthiness of the accused 
and the prescribed punishment‖. Cameron‘s argument is part of a larger plea to restrict the 
substantive ambit of s. 7, instead treating issues of moral blame with more robust s. 12 scrutiny. 
72  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 57.  
73  Id., at para. 66. 
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must not be ―left on the books subject to discretionary case-by-case 
remedies‖.
74
 If the law admits of substantively unconstitutional results, 
no matter how rare, section 52(1) mandates that the law be struck down. 
This is the appropriate result, she explains, because ―[t]he ball is thrown 
back into Parliament‘s court, to revise the law, should it choose to do so, 
so that it no longer produces unconstitutional effects.‖
75
  
The Court‘s concern for the substantive integrity of the law becomes 
even clearer when McLachlin C.J.C. moves on to discuss the potential 
impacts of one remedy or the other on values underlying the rule of law. 
Viewed from a rule of law perspective, the Court‘s chief concern with 
the constitutional exemption is the chasm that it can open up between 
what the statutes appear to demand and what courts are doing to mitigate 
the harshness of these minimums: ―[a]s constitutional exemptions are 
actually granted, the law in the statute books will in fact increasingly 
diverge from the law as applied.‖
76
 The Chief Justice reasons that this 
gap creates unacceptable uncertainty and impedes predictability, but very 
importantly from the perspective of assessing the Court‘s message about 
the judiciary‘s relationship to the legislative politics of minimum 
sentences, McLachlin C.J.C. concludes her discussion with the following 
statement: ―Bad law, fixed up on a case-by-case basis by the courts, does 
not accord with the role and responsibility of Parliament to enact 
constitutional laws for the people of Canada.‖
77
 The manifest concern is 
equipping courts with the constitutionally appropriate tools to push 
Parliament to exercise its constitutional role of considering carefully the 
substantive fairness of the laws it creates. Striking down legislation that 
permits cruel and unusual punishment, rather than mopping up the hard 
cases with constitutional exemptions, provides ―clear guidance from the 
courts as to what is constitutionally permissible and what must be done 
to remedy legislation that is found to be constitutionally infirm‖.
78
 
Ferguson is, thus, not simply a decision that tidies up a remedial 
loose end. Nor, in my view, is it properly read as a retreat from scrutiny 
of minimum sentences or the loss of a workable solution to the exceptional 
                                                                                                             
74  Id., at para. 65. 
75  Id. 
76  Id., at para. 70. Coughlan shares this view, describing constitutional exemptions as 
―unavoidably inconsistent‖ with the rule of law and arguing that Ferguson ―should be expanded 
beyond section 12 cases to any situation where it is proposed that a law should remain in place and 
not be declared invalid, but that the law should not be applied on this occasion‖. Steve Coughlan, 
―The End of Constitutional Exemptions‖ (2008) 54 C.R. (6th) 220, at 221. 
77  Ferguson, id., at para. 73. 
78  Id. 
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case. To the contrary, Ferguson is best read as an intervention by the 
Supreme Court that holds more promise than the constitutional exemption 
to moderate and discipline the politics of minimum sentences. Use of the 
constitutional exemption allowed politicians to remain untroubled in 
their thrall to the political appeal of the mandatory minimum sentence. 
My reasoning here is premised on the conviction, expressed earlier, that 
given a substantial minimum sentence and enough time, the exceptional 
cases in which a high minimum would inflict cruel and unusual punishment 
will arise. The constitutional exemption puts the courts in the position of 
cleaning up these unjust deposits of minimum sentences in a manner that 
relieves Parliament of the need to think carefully about the hard case 
when crafting sentencing policy.
79
 The political incentives for crafting 
new and higher mandatory minimums remain unmolested by the 
constitutional exemption. By contrast, in Ferguson the Supreme Court 
ensured that there would be constitutional counterweights that, added to 
the political mix, have the potential to slow and moderate the 
proliferation of minimums. After Ferguson, a court met with either 
reasonable hypotheticals or an extraordinary case that exposes a sentence 
as permitting cruel and unusual punishment will strike down the law, 
requiring Parliament to reconsider the justness of the minimum. 
Parliament‘s response might be to abandon the minimum, to moderate 
the minimum, to introduce a qualified discretion for the sentencing 
judge or — if the legislative wisdom is that the impugned minimum is 
                                                                                                             
79  To the contrary, one might point to the enactment of s. 113 of the Criminal Code in 1995 
as evidence that the granting of constitutional exemptions can exert a certain degree of pressure on 
Parliament to reconsider and amend mandatory sentencing laws. Section 113 responded to a number 
of decisions providing constitutional exemptions to mandatory firearm prohibition orders by creating 
a narrow judicial discretion to mitigate such orders. See R. v. Chief, [1989] Y.J. No. 131, 51 C.C.C. 
(3d) 265 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. McGillivary, [1991] S.J. No. 68, 62 C.C.C. (3d) 407 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. 
Nester, [1992] N.W.T.J. No. 15, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 477 (N.W.T.C.A.). Section 113 was enacted, 
however, at a time when the status of constitutional exemptions was extremely uncertain. My 
argument is that if, at the time, the status of constitutional exemptions had been certain — whether 
by consistent use or the Supreme Court of Canada giving them its imprimatur — Parliament would 
have had little incentive to enact this legislation. This is the same logic that informs Sankoff‘s view, 
with which I agree, that ―[t]he confirmed existence of a constitutional exemption remedy … might 
actually provide the impetus for the drafting of more legislation of mandatory application‖ (―An 
Ongoing Problem‖, supra, note 15, at 239). The structural dynamic created by Ferguson is akin to 
that triggered by R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No. 2787, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), in which the 
Court declared the marijuana prohibition in s. 4 of the Controlled Drug and Substances Act, S.C. 
1996, c. 19 to be invalid and suspended that declaration for one year to provide an opportunity for 
Parliament to respond, ultimately prompting the creation of the Marihuana Medical Access 
Regulations, SOR/2001-227. 
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necessary and effective — to invoke the notwithstanding clause.
80
 
Although the latter result is rather unlikely, this unlikelihood demonstrates 
the effect of Ferguson: it injects the realities of sentencing — the real 
violence and potential harshness of punishment — into the matrix of 
parliamentary decision-making. This is the most direct effect of 
Ferguson, an effect that will materialize when the hard case comes up in 
court. But it may even be that the mere knowledge that this is the 
approach that the judiciary will now take can influence political decision-
making about crafting new mandatory minimums. Drafters deprived of 
the comfort of knowing that legislation (and, with it, the government‘s 
―tough on crime‖ posture) will remain intact while courts step up to do 
what is just in the hard case have increased incentive to take this factor 
— what may be just in the hard case — into account when proposing 
new or higher minimums.  
Viewed from the perspective of constitutional structure and theory, 
one way of understanding the case is that Ferguson improves on the 
distribution of responsibility for constitutional interpretation in the field 
of penal law. In a system of constitutional exemptions, Parliament is, at 
best, required to think about a proposed law‘s potential to inflict cruel 
and unusual punishment once and only with ―common‖ cases in mind. 
Once a mandatory minimum is enacted and found to be generally 
constitutional, Parliament can utterly wash its hands of the day-to-day 
application of that law. After Ferguson, Parliament can be met with the 
extraordinary case and required to reassess policy in light of the realities 
of sentencing. Granted, the Court may still be taking the lead in 
interpreting section 12, but Parliament is never wholly off the hook for 
wrestling with the values reflected in section 12 and, as such, the 
substantive justness — the cruelty or humaneness — of its sentencing 
policies.
81
 Of course, nothing ensures that a given government will take 
this role to heart. In a ―tough on crime‖ environment, it may be that the 
                                                                                                             
80  In this way, Ferguson may represent the ―return … to vigorous judicial enforcement 
against cruel and unusual punishment by striking down mandatory sentences‖ hoped for by Roach, 
supra, note 14, at 411, a return that he thought would have ―the potential to produce a robust and 
democratic dialogue between the courts and the legislature that considers both the effect of 
punishment on offenders and the adequacy of less draconian alternatives‖. 
81  There is an interesting and potentially important way in which Ferguson, supra, note 16 
may have an effect on Crown conduct as well. After Ferguson, in a marginal case in which a court 
might conclude that a minimum sentence would inflict cruel and unusual punishment, the Crown 
must now balance proceeding with this charge, rather than an offence for which judicial discretion at 
sentencing is still intact, against the risk of a declaration of invalidity rather than merely a personal 
remedy for the accused. In this way, the use of legislated mandatory minimums might be somewhat 
disciplined by Ferguson.  
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easiest political response is to bemoan a court‘s ruling as ―soft on crime‖ 
and engage in relatively superficial reconsideration of the law and 
constitutional imperatives. But Ferguson at least creates some structural 
pressure and the possibility for deeper legislative reflection on the 
justness of penal policy; and, in the meantime, a mandatory minimum 
sentence that admits of cruel and unusual punishment — a minimum 
sentence that therefore has no place in Canadian law — is excised from 
the statute. Legal ingenuity will be focused not on the means of evading 
the harshness of laws but, rather, on their substantive quality.   
IV. JUDICIAL EXPECTATIONS 
I have argued that the Court‘s strong message to sentencing courts is 
that in any case in which a judge would have previously been satisfied 
that a constitutional exemption from a mandatory sentence was justified, 
that judge should instead strike down that statutory minimum, declaring 
it to be of no force or effect, in accordance with section 52(1) of the 
Constitution. My interpretation of the significance of Ferguson and its 
potential for disrupting or moderating the contemporary political inertia 
towards more and increased minimum sentences leans heavily on the 
expectation that judges will take this as the message of the decision and 
act upon it. 
Accordingly, one challenge that can be put to my argument as to how 
the case should be received is to ask whether, if this is truly what the 
Court had in mind, the message to trial judges was sufficiently clear. 
This kind of challenge is suggested by Professor Dufraimont‘s analysis 
of Ferguson.
82
 Although McLachlin C.J.C. states that ―[i]f a mandatory 
minimum sentence would create an unconstitutional result in a particular 
case, the minimum sentence must be struck down,‖
83
 Dufraimont asks 
whether ―[o]n the basis of this brief passage, [we can] really expect 
lower court judges faced with exceptional cases to disregard prior 
decisions on the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences‖
84
 
and argues that ―[i]f the Court envisions lower courts striking down 
mandatory minimum sentences despite higher court decisions upholding 
them, then that expectation should be made explicit.‖
85
 I differ in my 
                                                                                                             
82  Dufraimont, supra, note 17. 
83  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 13.  
84  Dufraimont, supra, note 17, at 475. 
85  Id., at 478. 
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view of the clarity and content of the Court‘s message; in my view, the 
expectation is explicit and does not require lower court judges to ignore 
precedent. First, with respect to the role of precedent, it must be recalled 
that the Court is addressing those cases that do not fall within a 
reasonable hypotheticals analysis. A lower court would be bound in a 
case that presents facts that are on all fours with a prior analysis that 
found that a minimum did not offend section 12. But we are dealing with 
the exceptional case. If a given case presents unique circumstances not 
already addressed in a prior decision, the Chief Justice is clear in this 
passage that the sentencing judge must provide a section 52(1) remedy.  
With respect to clarity, this admonition to strike down any law that, 
on the facts of the case before a judge, would result in a cruel and 
unusual punishment is not, in my view, a ―passing reference‖.
86
 It 
appears in the paragraph in which the Chief Justice is providing a 
summary of her conclusion in the case, a critical passage in the 
judgment. Furthermore, this is not the only place in the reasons at which 
this point is made, nor is it the most emphatic instance of this message. 
Later in the judgment, as she takes up the analysis of which remedy is 
appropriate, McLachlin C.J.C. states ―[t]he imposition of cruel and 
unusual punishment contrary to ss. 12 and 1 of the Charter cannot be 
countenanced‖ and that ―[a] court which has found a violation of a 
Charter right has a duty to provide an effective remedy.‖
87
 Perhaps most 
directly and decisively, at the point in the judgment at which she 
concludes that the first two rationales would be sufficient to exclude 
constitutional exemptions, the Chief Justice summarizes her message: ―a 
court that concludes that a mandatory minimum sentence imposes cruel 
and unusual punishment in an exceptional case before it is compelled to 
declare the provision invalid‖.
88
 The message is, in my view, clear. The 
Supreme Court is directing judges that their duty is to provide an 
effective remedy when the case before them shows that a minimum 
sentence will produce cruel and unusual punishment, advising them that 
the only appropriate remedy is to strike down the law because it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, and conveying to judges that they 
should not hesitate to do so.  
If the direction to lower court judges is clear enough, one might still 
object that, no matter how clear the instructions as to its use, a sentencing 
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87  Ferguson, supra, note 16, at para. 34 (emphasis added). 
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judge who was otherwise willing to sand the edges of the law using 
constitutional exemptions may be reluctant to swing what feels like a 
sledgehammer. In short, perhaps it is unduly optimistic and overly 
sanguine of me to predict that sentencing judges, seized with the 
direction from Ferguson and given time and the right case, will see their 
way clear to striking down a minimum sentence. Setting aside any 
concerns about the clarity of the Supreme Court‘s message in Ferguson, 
this objection arises from a suspicion that judges might approach the 
section 12 inquiry differently with a section 52(1) remedy waiting at the 
end of the line. Will judges be slower to find an unjustified breach of 
section 12 given their knowledge that they must strike down the law if 
they so find?
89
 To be sure, the ―sticker shock‖ of being faced with having 
to strike down an otherwise fair law because of injustices in a single 
exceptional case is more than that produced by a constitutional 
exemption. Indeed, I expect that this concern, above all others, is what 
leads to any sense that Ferguson ultimately will spell a retreat from the 
scrutiny of mandatory minimum sentences. Yet this is a matter of 
predicting judicial behaviour and can ultimately only be addressed in due 
course with an empirical answer. My own sense, however, is that most 
sentencing judges are not timorous souls. With the Supreme Court‘s 
message in Ferguson made clear, including its emphatic statement about 
the role of the courts and the correlative role of Parliament in this area, 
my prediction is that cases will indeed arise in which judges will 
conclude that, on the facts, a minimum sentence would amount to cruel 
and unusual punishment and, seized with Ferguson, will strike down the 
law. What is more, whether a given sentence amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment is a matter subject to appellate review. As such, it is 
not only sentencing judges who will be responsible for giving effect to 
Ferguson. With the accretion of cases brought before various judges, 
with their assessments then reconsidered and tested in the appellate 
process, I think it entirely reasonable to anticipate that we will indeed see 
the kind of judicial intervention in the politics of minimum sentences that 
my reading of Ferguson suggests.  
                                                                                                             
89  In ―The Future of Mandatory Sentences‖, supra, note 57, at 2, Roach calls this the ―likely 
pessimistic scenario‖ and rightly notes that the risk of Ferguson being received in this manner would 
be that ―the drastic consequences of a declaration of invalidity will make jurisprudence under s. 12 
of the Charter even more deferential to Parliament‘s use of mandatory sentences.‖ Roach concedes, 
however, that this is not the only scenario and that ―[t]rial judges who experience first hand the 
effects of applying mandatory sentences in odd cases may decide to pull the trigger and strike down 
the entire mandatory sentence.‖ 
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V. CONCLUSION — THE CHARTER AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
Every right guaranteed in the Charter has two aspects. Very 
importantly, a right offers relief to an individual aggrieved by state 
action. Both the structure of adjudication and the language of the Charter 
— guaranteeing rights to ―everyone‖, ―any person‖, ―every individual‖ 
and ―every citizen‖ — keep this dimension of rights protection at the 
forefront of our minds. But every right also expresses something about 
the kind of government and laws to which we aspire. The protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure is normally invoked by a given 
accused in the context of his or her encounter with the police; but section 
8 also contains within it the demand that government take seriously 
people‘s privacy interests in all that it does. The right to a fair trial is 
enjoyed by everyone charged with an offence; but the benefit of a 
government of due process and adjudicative fairness also redounds to the 
community at large. The guarantee of equality is afforded to every 
individual; but it also evinces an aspiration for a government mindful of 
and attentive to the potential disparate impact of laws and state action. 
―Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment.‖ At its core, this article has argued that 
Ferguson should be read as a decision that reminds us that this language 
is not only a personal protection offered to each individual but also an 
expression of a norm with which we want our government to seriously 
wrestle when it turns its attention to questions of penal policy. As I have 
explained, if judges heed the Court‘s decision in Ferguson legislators 
will be forced to contemplate the exceptional case in a way that the 
continued use of constitutional exemptions would simply not have 
impelled. This alone might not adequately disrupt the disturbing trend in 
Canada towards more and higher minimum sentences, but it may trouble 
the easy politics around minimum sentences and will at least send the 
right judicial message about the substantive demands we make of our 
penal laws. Ferguson says that the realization of the potential for a 
minimum sentence to inflict cruel and unusual punishment is not a matter 
that should be addressed in a given case and then treated as an aberration. 
It is a flaw in the character of the law that, as a constitutional matter, 
demands the reappraisal of an a priori assessment of what justice will 
always require. 
 
 
